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ABSTRACT
Cloud computing is a paradigm that has the potential to
transform and revolutionalize the next generation IT indus-
try by making software available to end-users as a service.
A cloud, also commonly known as a cloud network, typically
comprises of hardware (network of servers) and a collection
of softwares that is made available to end-users in a pay-as-
you-go manner. Multiple public cloud providers (ex., Ama-
zon) co-existing in a cloud computing market provide similar
services (software as a service) to its clients, both in terms of
the nature of an application, as well as in quality of service
(QoS) provision. The decision of whether a cloud hosts (or
finds it profitable to host) a service in the long-term would
depend jointly on the price it sets, the QoS guarantees it
provides to its customers , and the satisfaction of the adver-
tised guarantees. In this paper, we devise and analyze three
inter-organizational economic models relevant to cloud net-
works. We formulate our problems as non co-operative price
and QoS games between multiple cloud providers existing in
a cloud market. We prove that a unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (NE) exists in two of the three models. Our
analysis paves the path for each cloud provider to 1) know
what prices and QoS level to set for end-users of a given
service type, such that the provider could exist in the cloud
market, and 2) practically and dynamically provision appro-
priate capacity for satisfying advertised QoS guarantees.
Keywords: cloud markets; competition; Nash equilibrium
1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is a type of Internet-based computing,
where shared resources, hardware, software, and informa-
tion are provided to end-users in an on demand fashion. It
is a paradigm that has the potential to transform and revo-
lutionalize the IT industry by making software available to
end-users as a service [1]. A public cloud typically comprises
of hardware (network of servers) and a collection of softwares
that is made available to the general public in a pay-as-you-
go manner. Typical examples of companies providing public
clouds include Amazon, Google, Microsoft, E-Bay, and com-
mercial banks. Public cloud providers usually provide Soft-
ware as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).The advantage of making
software available as a service is three-fold [1], 1) the service
providers benefit from simplified software installation, main-
tenance, and centralized versioning, 2) end-users can access
the software in an ‘anytime anywhere’ manner, can store
data safely in the cloud infrastructure, and do not have to
think about provisioning any hardware resource due to the
illusion of infinite computing resources available on demand,
and 3) end-users can pay for using computing resources on
a short-term basis (ex., by the hour or by the day) and can
release the resources on task completion. Similar benefit
types are also obtained by making both, platform as well as
infrastructure available as service.
Cloud economics will play a vital role in shaping the cloud
computing industry of the future. In a recent Microsoft
white paper titled “Economics of the Cloud”, it has been
stated that the computing industry is moving towards the
cloud driven by three important economies of scale: 1) large
data centers can deploy computational resources at signifi-
cantly lower costs than smaller ones, 2) demand pooling im-
proves utilization of resources, and 3) multi-tenancy lowers
application maintenance labor costs for large public clouds.
The cloud also provides an opportunity to IT professionals
to focus more on technological innovation rather than think-
ing of the budget of ”keeping the lights on”. The economics
of the cloud can be thought of having two dimensions: 1)
intra-organization economics and 2) inter-organization eco-
nomics. Intra-organization economics deals with the eco-
nomics of internal factors of an organization like labor, power,
hardware, security, etc., whereas inter-organization economics
refers to the economics of market competition factors be-
tween organizations. Examples of some popular factors are
price, QoS, reputation, and customer service. In this paper,
we focus on inter-organizational economic issues.
Multiple public cloud providers (ex., Amazon, Google, Mi-
crosoft, etc.,) co-existing in a cloud computing market pro-
vide similar services (software as a service, ex., Google Docs
and Microsoft Office Live) to its clients, both in terms of
the nature of an application, as well as in quality of ser-
vice (QoS) provision. The decision of whether a cloud hosts
(or finds it profitable to host) a service in the long-term
would (amongst other factors) depend jointly on the price it
sets, the QoS guarantees it provides to its customers1, and
the satisfaction of the advertised guarantees. Setting high
prices might result in a drop in demand for a particular ser-
vice, whereas setting low prices might attract customers at
the expense of lowering cloud provider profits. Similarly, ad-
vertising and satisfying high QoS levels would favor a cloud
provider (CP) in attracting more customers. The price and
1A cloud provider generally gets requests from a cloud cus-
tomer, which in turn accepts requests from Internet end-
users. Thus, typically, the clients/customers of a cloud
provider are the cloud customers. However, for modeling
purposes, end-users could also be treated as customers. (See
Section 2)
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Step 1: Price AND/OR QoS Game between CPs
Step 2: Nash Equilibrium Outcome/s (Advertized Price AND/OR QoS)
End-Users
End-User Demand End-User Demand
CPs allocate resources accordinglyStep 3
Figure 1: Pricing Directed Resource Allocation in
Clouds.
QoS levels set by the CPs thus drive the end-user demand,
which, apart from determining the market power of a CP
also plays a major role in CPs estimating the minimal re-
source capacity to meet their advertised guarantees (Fig-
ure 1). The estimation problem is an important challenge
in cloud computing with respect to resource provisioning be-
cause a successful estimation would prevent CPs to provision
for the peak, thereby reducing resource wastage.
The competition in prices and QoS amongst the cloud
providers entails the formation of non-cooperative games
amongst competitive CPs. Thus, we have a distributed sys-
tem of CPs (players in the game), where each CP wants to
maximize its own profits and would tend towards playing a
Nash equilibrium2 (NE) strategy (i.e., each CP would want
to set the NE prices and QoS levels.), whereby the whole
system of CPs would have no incentive to deviate from the
Nash equilibrium point, i.e., the vector of NE strategies of
each CP. However, for each CP to play a NE strategy, the
latter should mathematically exist. In this paper, we ad-
dress the important problem of Nash Equilibrium charac-
terization of different types of price and QoS games relevant
to cloud networks, its properties, practical implementabil-
ity (convergence issues), and the sensitivity analysis of NE
price/QoS variations by any CP on the price and QoS levels
of other CPs. Our problem is important from a resource
provisioning perspective as mentioned in the previous para-
graph, apart from it having obvious strategic importance on
CPs in terms of sustenance in the cloud market.
In regard to market competition driven network pricing,
there exists research work in the domain of multiple ISP in-
teraction and tiered Internet services [10][12], as well as in
the area of resource allocation and Internet congestion man-
agement [6][8][11]. However, the market competition in our
work relates to optimal capacity planning and resource pro-
visioning in clouds. There is the seminal work by Songhurst
and Kelly [13] on pricing schemes based on QoS require-
ments of users. Their work address multi-service scenarios
2A group of players is in Nash equilibrium if each one is
making the best decision(strategy) that he or she can, taking
into account the decisions of the others.
and derive pricing schemes for each service based on the QoS
requirements for each, and in turn bandwidth reservations.
This work resembles ours to some extent in the sense that
the price and QoS determined can determine optimal band-
width provisions. However, it does not account for market
competition between multiple providers and only focus on a
single service provider providing multiple services, i.e., the
paper addresses an intra-organization economics problem.
However, in this paper, we assume single-service scenarios
by multiple service providers.
Our proposed theory analyzes a few basic inter-organizational
economic models through which cloud services could be priced
under market competition. The evolution of commercial
public cloud service markets is still in its inception. How-
ever, with the gaining popularity of cloud services, we ex-
pect a big surge in public cloud services competition in the
years to come. The models proposed in this paper take a
substantial step in highlighting relevant models to the cloud
networking community for them adopt so as to appropri-
ately price current and future cloud services. In practice,
scenarios of price and/or QoS competition between organi-
zations exist in the mobile network services and ISP mar-
kets. For example, AT&T and Verizon are competing on
service, i.e., Verizon promises to provide better coverage
to mobile users than AT&T, thereby increasing its propen-
sity to attract more customers. Similarly, price competition
between ISPs always existed for providing broadband ser-
vices at a certain given bandwidth guarantee. Regarding
our work, we also want to emphasize 1) we do not make any
claims about our models being the only way to model inter-
organizational cloud economics3 and 2) there is a depen-
dency between intra-organizational and inter-organizational
economic factors, which we do not account in this paper due
to modeling simplicity. However, through our work, we defi-
nitely provide readers with a concrete modeling intuition to
go about addressing problems in cloud economics. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide an analyt-
ical model on inter-organizational cloud economics.
Our Contributions
1. We formulate a separable end-user demand function
for each cloud provider w.r.t. to price and QoS levels
set by them and derive their individual utility func-
tions (profit function). We then define the various
price-QoS games that we analyze in the paper. (See
Section 2)
2. We develop a model where the QoS guarantees pro-
vided by public CPs to end-users for a particular appli-
cation type are pre-specified and fixed, and the cloud
providers compete for prices. We formulate a non-
cooperative price game amongst the players (i.e., the
cloud providers) and prove that there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium of the game, and that the NE could
be practically computed (i.e., it converges). (See Sec-
tion 3)
3. We develop a non-cooperative game-theoretic model
where public cloud providers jointly compete for the
price and QoS levels related to a particular application
type. We show the existence and convergence of Nash
equilibria (See Section 4). As a special case of this
3We only model price and QoS as parameters. One could
choose other parameters (in addition to price and QoS,
which are essential parameters) and a different analysis
mechanism than ours to arrive at a different model.
CP CC EU
Contract 1 Contract 2
Virtual Direct Contract between CP and EU
Figure 2: Virtual Direct Contract between CP and
EU.
model, we also analyze the case where prices charged
to Internet end-users are pre-specified and fixed, and
the cloud providers compete for QoS guarantees only.
The models mentioned in contributions 3 and 4 drive
optimal capacity planning and resource provisioning
in clouds, apart from maximizing CP profits. (See
Section 4)
4. We conduct a sensitivity analysis on various parame-
ters of our proposed models, and study the effect of
changes in the parameters on the equilibrium price
and QoS levels of the CPs existing in a cloud mar-
ket. Through a sensitivity analysis, we infer the effect
of price and QoS changes of cloud providers on their
respective profits, as well as the profits of competing
CPs. (See Sections 3 and 4)4
2. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider a market of n competing cloud providers,
where each provider services application types to end-users
at a given QoS guarantee. We assume that end-users are
customers of cloud providers in an indirect manner, i.e., In-
ternet end-users use online softwares developed by compa-
nies (cloud customers), that depend on cloud providers to
service their customer requests. Each CP is in competi-
tion with others in the market for services provided on the
same type of application w.r.t functionality and QoS guaran-
tees. For example, Microsoft and Google might both serve a
word processing application to end-users by providing sim-
ilar QoS guarantees. Here, the word processing application
represents a particular ‘type’. For a given application type,
we assume that each end user signs a contract with a par-
ticular CP for a given time period5, and within that period
it does not switch to any other CP for getting service on the
same application type. Regarding contracts between a CP
and its end-users, we assume that a cloud customer forwards
service requests to a cloud provider on behalf of end-users,
who sign up with a cloud customer (CC) for service. The CP
charges its cloud customer, who is turn charges its end-users
(Figure 2). We approximate this two-step charging scheme
by modeling a virtual one-step scheme, where a CP charges
end-users directly6.
4We study Nash equilibrium convergence as its proves the
achievability of an equilibrium point in the market. We
emphasize here that the existence of Nash equilibrium does
not imply achievability as it may take the cloud market an
eternity to reach equilibrium, even though there may exist
one theoretically.
5In this paper, the term ‘time-period’ refers to the time
duration of a contract between the CP and end-users.
6We assume here that prices are negotiated between the CP,
CC, and end-users and there is a virtual direct price charging
connection between the CP and its end-users. We make this
approximation for modeling simplicity.
In a given time period, each CP i positions itself in the
market by selecting a price pi and a QoS level si related
to a given application type. Throughout the paper, we as-
sume that the CPs compete on a single given type7. We
define si as the difference between a benchmark response
time upper bound, rt, and the actual response time rti, i.e.,
si = rt − rti. For example, if for a particular application
type, every CP would respond to an end-user request within
10 seconds, rt = 10. The response time rti may be defined,
either in terms of the expected steady state response time,
i.e., rti = E(RTi), or in terms of φ-percentile performance,
rti(φ), where 0 < φ < 1. Thus, in terms of φ-percentile
performance8, P (RTi < rti(φ)) = φ.
We model each CP i as an M/M/1 queueing system, where
end-user requests arrive as a Poisson process with mean rate
λi, and gets serviced at a rate µi. We adopt an M/M/1
queueing system because of three reasons: 1) queueing the-
ory has been traditionally used in request arrival and service
problems, 2) for our problem, assuming an M/M/1 queue-
ing system ensures tractable analyses procedures that entails
deriving nice closed form expressions and helps understand
system insights in a non-complex manner, without sacrific-
ing a great deal in capturing the real dynamics of the actual
arrival-departure process, and 3) The Markovian nature of
the service process helps us generalize expected steady state
analysis and percentile analysis together. According to the
theory of M/M/1 queues, we have the following standard
results [3].
rti =
1
µi − λi , (1)
rti(φ) =
ln( 1
1−φ )
µi(φ)− λi , (2)
µi = λi +
1
rti
, (3)
and
µi(φ) = λi +
ln( 1
1−φ )
rti(φ)
(4)
Equations 2 and 4 follow from the fact that for M/M/1
queues, P (RTi < rti(φ)) = φ = 1−e−(µi−λirti(φ)). Without
loss of generality, in subsequent sections of this paper, we
conduct our analysis on expected steady state parameters.
As mentioned previously, due to the Markovian nature of
the service process, the case for percentiles is exactly simi-
lar to the case for expected steady state analysis, the only
difference in analysis being due to the constant, ln( 1
1−φ ).
Thus, all our proposed equilibrium related results hold true
for percentile analysis as well.
Each cloud provider i incurs a fixed cost ci per user re-
quest served and a fixed cost ρi per unit of service capacity
7In reality, each CP may in general service several applica-
tion types concurrently. We do not model this case in our
paper and leave it for future work. The case for single appli-
cation types gives interesting results, which would prove to
be useful in analyzing the multiple concurrent application
type scenario.
8As an example, in cloud networks we often associate pro-
visioning power according to the 95th percentile use. Like-
wise, we could also provision service capacity by accounting
for percentile response time guarantees.
provisioned. ci arises due to the factor λi in Equation 3
and ρi arises due to the factor
1
rti
in the same equation. In
this sense, our QoS-dependent pricing models are queueing-
driven. A cloud provider charges pri to service each end-user
request, where pri  [pr
min
i , pr
max
i ]. It is evident that each
CP selects a price that results in it accruing a non-negative
gross profit margin. The gross profit margin for CP i is given
as pri− ci−ρi, where ci+ρi is the marginal cost per unit of
end-user demand. Thus, the price lower bound, prmini , for
each CP i is determined by the following equation.
prmini = ci + ρi, ∀i = 1, ..., n (5)
We define the demand of any CP i, λi, as a function of the
vectors pr = (pr1, ....., prn) and s = (s1, ......, sn). Mathe-
matically, we express the demand function as
λi = λi(pr, s) = xi(si)−yipri−
∑
j 6=i
αij(sj)+
∑
j 6=i
βijprj , (6)
where xi(si) is an increasing, concave, and thrice differen-
tiable function in si satisfying the property of non-increasing
marginal returns to scale, i.e., equal-sized reductions in re-
sponse time results in progressively smaller increases in end-
user demand. The functions αij are assumed to be non-
decreasing and differentiable. A typical example of a func-
tion fitting xi(si) and αij(sj) is a logarithmic function. We
model Equation 6 as a separable function of price and QoS
vectors, for ensuring tractable analyses as well as for ex-
tracting the independent effects of price and QoS changes on
the overall end-user demand. Intuitively, Equation 6 states
that QoS improvements by a CP i result in an increase in
its end-user demand, whereas QoS improvements by other
competitor CPs result in a decrease in its demand. Simi-
larly, a price increase by a CP i results in a decrease in its
end-user demand, whereas price increases by other compet-
ing CPs result in an increase in its demand. Without loss
of practical generality, we also assume 1) a uniform increase
in prices by all n CPs cannot result in an increase in any
CP’s demand volume, and 2) a price increase by a given CP
cannot result in an increase in the market’s aggregate end-
user demand. Mathematically, we represent these two facts
by the following two relationships.
yi >
∑
j 6=i
βij , i = 1, ......, n (7)
and
yi >
∑
j 6=i
βji, i = 1, ......., n (8)
The long run average profit for CP i in a given time period,
assuming that response times are expressed in terms of ex-
pected values, is a function of the price and QoS levels of
CPs, and is given as
Pi(pr, s) = λi(pri − ci − ρi)− ρi
rt− si , ∀i (9)
The profit function for each CP acts as its utility/payoff
function when it is involved in price and QoS games with
other competing CPs. We assume in this paper that the
profit function for each CP is known to other CPs, but none
of the CPs know the values of the parameters that other
competing CPs adopt as their strategy.
Problem Statement: Given the profit function for each CP
Symbol Meaning
Ui = Pi Utility function of CP i
pri Price charged by CP i per end-user
pr Price vector of CPs
pr∗ Nash equilibrium price vector
ci Cost incurred by CP i to service each user
λi Arrival rate of end-users to CP i
ρi cost/unit of capacity provisioning by CP i
rt response time upper bound guarantee
rti response time guarantee by CP i
φ percentile parameter
si QoS level guarantee provided by CP i to its users
s QoS vector of CPs
s∗ Nash equilibrium QoS vector
xi() increasing, concave, and a thrice differentiable function
αij() non-decreasing and differentiable function
Table 1: List of Symbols and Their Meaning
(public information), how would each advertise its price and
QoS values (without negotiating with other CPs) to end-
users so as to maximize its own profit. In other words, in a
competitive game of profits played by CPs, is there a situa-
tion where each CP is happy with its (price, QoS) advertised
pair and does not benefit by a positive or negative deviation
in the values of the advertised pair.
In this paper, we study games involving price and QoS
as the primary parameters, i.e., we characterize and analyze
the existence, uniqueness, and convergence of Nash equilib-
ria. Our primary goal is to compute the optimal price and
QoS levels offered by CPs to its end-users under market com-
petition. Our analysis paves the path for each cloud provider
to 1) know what price and QoS levels to set for its clients
(end-users) for a given application type, such that it could
exist in the cloud market, and 2) practically and dynami-
cally provision appropriate capacity for satisfying advertised
QoS guarantees, by taking advantage of the property of vir-
tualization in cloud networks. The property of virtualization
entails each CP to allocate optimal resources dynamically in
a fast manner to service end-user requests. Using our pric-
ing framework, in each time period, cloud providers set the
appropriate price and QoS levels after competing in a game;
the resulting prices drive end-user demand; the CPs then
allocate optimal resources to service demand.
We consider the following types of price-QoS game models
in our work.
1. CP QoS guarantees are pre-specified; CPs compete
with each other for prices, given QoS guarantees. (Game
1)
2. CPs compete for price and QoS simultaneously. (Game
2)
3. CP price levels are pre-specified; CPs compete for QoS
levels. (Game 3). Game 3 is a special case of Game
2 and in Section 4, we will show that it is a Game 2
derivative.
List of Notations: For reader simplicity, we provide a table
of most used notations related to the analysis of games in
this paper.
3. GAME 1
In this section we analyze the game in which the QoS
guarantees of CPs are exogenously specified and the CPs
compete for prices.
Game Description
Players: Individual cloud providers
Game Type: Non-cooperative, i.e., no interaction between
CPs
Strategy Space: Choosing a price in range [prmini , pr
max
i ]
Player Goal: To maximize its individual utility Ui = Pi
Our first goal is to show that this game has a unique
price Nash equilibrium, pr∗(an instance of vector pr), which
satisfies the following first order condition
∂Pi
∂pri
= −yi(pri − ci − ρi) + λi, ∀i, (10)
which in matrix notation can be represented as
M · pr = x(s) + z, (11)
where M is an n×n matrix with Mii = 2yi, Mij = −βij , i 6=
j, and where zi = yi(ci + ρi).
We have the following theorem and corollary regarding
equilibrium results for our game.
Theorem 1: Given that the QoS guarantees of CPs are ex-
ogenously specified, the price competition game has a unique
Nash equilibrium, pr∗, which satisfies Equation 11. The
Nash equilibrium user demand, λ∗i , for each CP i evaluates
to yi(pr
∗
i − ci − ρi), and the Nash equilibrium profits, P ∗i ,
for each CP i is given by yi(pr
∗
i − ci − ρi)2 − ρirt−si .
Proof: For a given service level vector s, each CP i re-
serves a capacity of 1
rti
= 1−→
rt−si
. Consider the game G
with profit/utility functions for each CP i represented as
Pi = (xi(si)−yipi−
∑
j 6=i
αij(sj)+
∑
j 6=i
(βijpj)(pri−ci−ρi)−W,
(12)
where
W =
ρi
rt− si
Since ∂
2Pi
∂pri∂prj
= βij , the function Pi is supermodular
9.
The strategy set of each CP i lies inside a closed inter-
val and is bounded, i.e., the strategy set is [prmini , pr
max
i ],
which is a compact set. Thus, the pricing game between
CPs is a supermodular game and possesses a Nash equilib-
rium [15]. Since yi >
∑
j 6=i βij , i = 1, ......, n (by Equation
7),− ∂2Pi
∂pr2i
>
∑
i 6=j
∂2Pi
∂pri∂prj
and thus the Nash equilibrium is
unique [5]. Rewriting Equation 11 and using Equation 6, we
get λ∗i = yi(pr
∗
i − ci − ρi). Substituting λ∗i in Equation 9,
we get P ∗i = yi(pr
∗
i − ci − ρi)2 − ρirt−si 
Corollary 1: a) pr∗ and λ∗ are increasing and decreasing
respectively in each of the parameters {ci, ρi, i = 1, 2, ..., n},
and b)
∂pr∗i
∂sj
= 1
yi
∂λ∗i
∂sj
= (M−1)ijx′j(sj)−
∑
l 6=j(M
−1)ilx′lj(sj).
Proof: Since the inverse of matrix M, i.e., M−1 exists and is
greater than or equal 0[2], from pr∗ = M−1(x(s)+z) (Equa-
tion 11), we have pr∗i is increasing in {ci, ρi i = 1, 2, ..., n}.
Again, from Lemma 2 in [2], we have δi ≡ yi(M−1)ii ⇒
9A function f : Rn → R is supermodular if it has the
following increasing difference property, i.e., f(m1i ,m−i) −
f(m2i ,m−i), increases in mi for all m
1
i > m
2
i in (pri, prj).
The readers are referred to [14] for more details on super-
modularity.
0.5 ≤ δi < 1, where δi is the degree of positive external-
ity10 faced by CP i from other CP (price, QoS) parame-
ters, and it increases with the β coefficients. This leads
us to ∂pri
∂ci
= ∂pri
∂ρi
= yi(M
−1)ii = δi > 0. Therefore,
we show in another different way that pr∗ is increasing in
{ci, ρi, i = 1, 2, ..., n}. Since M−1 exists and is greater than
or equal to 0, we again have ∂λi
∂ci
= ∂λi
∂ρi
= yi(
∂pri
∂ρi
− 1) =
yi(
∂pri
∂ci
− 1) = yi(δi − 1) < 0, from which we conclude that
λ∗ is decreasing in {ci, ρi, i = 1, 2, ..., n}. Part b) of the
corollary directly follows from the fact that the inverse of
matrix M, i.e., M−1 exists, is greater than or equal 0, and
every entry of M−1 is increasing in βij coefficients. 
Corollary 1 implies that 1) under a larger value for CP i′s
degree of positive externality δi, it is willing to make a bolder
price adjustment to an increase in any of its cost parameters,
thereby maintaining a larger portion of its original profit
margin. The reason is that competing CPs respond with
larger price themselves, and 2) there exists a critical value
0 ≤ s0ij ≤ rt such that as CP j increases its QoS level, pr∗i
and λ∗i are increasing on the interval [0, s
0
ij), and decreasing
in the interval [s0ij , rt).
Sensitivity Analysis: We know the following relationship
∂P ∗i
∂sj
= 2yi(pr
∗
i − ci − ρi)∂pr
∗
i
∂sj
(13)
From it we can infer that CP i’s profit increases as a result
of QoS level improvement by a competing CP j if and only
if the QoS level improvement results in an increase in CP i’s
price. This happens when P ∗i increases on the interval [0, s
0
ij ]
and decreases on the remaining interval (s0ij , rt]. In regard to
profit variation trends, on its own QoS level improvement,
a dominant trend for a CP is not observed. However, we
make two observations based on the holding of the following
relationship
∂P ∗i
∂sj
= 2yi(pr
∗
i − ci − ρi)∂pr
∗
i
∂sj
− ρi
(rt− si)2 (14)
If a CP i increases its QoS level from 0 to a positive value
and and this results in its price decrease, i’s equilibrium
profits become a decreasing function of its QoS level at all
times. Thus, in such a case i is better off providing minimal
QoS level to its customers. However, when CP i’s QoS level
increases from 0 to a positive value resulting in an increase
in its price charged to customers, there exists a QoS level
sbi such that the equilibrium profits alternates arbitrarily
between increasing and decreasing in the interval [0, sbi ), and
decreases when si ≥ sbi .
Convergence of Nash Equilibria: Since the price game in
question has a unique and optimal Nash equilibria, it can be
easily found by solving the system of first order conditions,
∂Pi
∂pri
= 0 for all i.
4. GAME 2
In this section we analyze the game in which the CPs com-
pete for both, price as well as QoS levels. In the process of
analyzing Game 2, we also derive Game 3, as a special case
of Game 2, and state results pertaining to Game 3.
10A positive externality is an external benefit on a user not
directly involved in a transaction. In our case, a transaction
refers to a CP setting its price and QoS parameters.
Game Description
Players: Individual cloud providers
Game Type: Non-cooperative, i.e., no interaction between
CPs
Strategy Space: price in range [prmini , pr
max
i ] and QoS level
si
Player Goal: To maximize its individual utility Ui = Pi
We have the following theorem regarding equilibrium re-
sults.
Theorem 2: Let rt ≤ 3
√
4yρ
(x′)2 , where y = mini yi, ρ =
mini ρi, x′ = maxi x′i(0). There exists a Nash equilibrium
(pr∗, s∗), which satisfies the following system of equations:
∂Pi
∂pri
= −yi(pri − ci − ρi) + λi = 0, ∀i, (15)
and satisfies the condition that either si(pri) is the unique
root of x′i(si)(pri − ci − ρi) = ρi(rt−si)2 if pri ≥ ci + ρi(1 +
1
rt2x′i(0)
) or si(pri) = 0 otherwise. Conversely, any solution
of these two equations is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: To prove our theorem, we just need to show that
the profit function Pi is jointly concave in (pri, si). Then by
the Nash-Debreu theorem [4], we could infer the existence
of a Nash equilibria. We know the following results for all
CP i
∂Pi
∂pri
= −yi(pri − ci − ρi) + λi (16)
and
∂Pi
∂θi
= x′i(si)(pri − ci − ρi)− ρi
(rt− si)2 (17)
Thus, ∂
2Pi
∂pr2i
= −2yi < 0, ∂2Pi∂s2i = x
′′
i (si)(pri − ci − ρi) −
2ρi
(rt−si)3 < 0,
∂2Pi
∂si∂pri
= x′i(si). We determine the determi-
nant of the Hessian as −2yi(x′′i (si)(pri−ci−ρi)− ρi(rt−si)2 ≥
0 (the sufficient condition for Pi to be jointly concave in
(pri, si)), if the following condition holds:
4yiρi
∂pr2i
≥ (x′i(si))2 ⇔ rt ≤ minsi 3
√
4yiρi
(x′i(si))2
= 3
√
4yiρi
(x′i(0))2
,
(18)
where the last equality follows from the fact that x′i > 0 and
x′i is decreasing. Now since pr
∗ = pr∗(s∗), by Theorem 1
it is in the closed and bounded interval [prmin, prmax] and
must therefore satisfy Equation 15. Again from Equation
17, we have ∂Pi
∂si
→ −∞ as si tends to rt, which leads us to
the conclusion that si(pri) is the unique root of x
′
i(si)(pri−
ci−ρi) = ρi(rt−si)2 if pri ≥ ci+ρi(1+
1
rt2x′i(0)
) or si(pri) = 0
otherwise. 
Sensitivity Analysis: We know that si(pri) depends on
x′i(si) and pri. Thus, from the implicit function theorem
[16] we infer that the QoS level of CP i increases with the
increase in its Nash equilibrium price. We have the following
relationship for pri > ci + ρi(1 +
1
rt2x′i(0)
),
s′i(pri) =
x′i(si)
x′′i (si)(pri − ci − ρi)− ρi(rt−si)2
> 0, (19)
whereas s′i(pri) = 0 for pri < ci + ρi(1 +
1
rt2x′i(0)
). We
also notice that for pri > ci + ρi(1 +
1
rt2x′i(0)
), s∗i increases
concavely with pr∗i . The value of si(pi) obtained from the
solution of the equation x′i(si)(pri − ci − ρi) = ρi(rt−si)2 if
pri ≥ ci + ρi(1 + 1
rt2x′i(0)
), can be fed into Equation 15 to
compute the price vector. The system of equations that re-
sult after substitution is non-linear in vector pr and could
have multiple solutions, i.e., multiple Nash equilibria.
Inferences from Sensitivity Analysis: Games 1, 2, and 3
gives us non-intuitive insights to the price-Qos changes by
individual CPs. We observe that the obvious intuitions of
equilibrium price decrease of competing CPs with increasing
QoS levels and vice-versa do not hold under all situations
and sensitivity analysis provide the conditions under which
the counter-result holds. Thus, the intricate nature of non-
cooperative strategy selection by individual CPs and the in-
terdependencies of individual strategies on the cloud market
make cloud economics problems interesting.
Convergence of Nash Equilibria: Since multiple Nash equi-
libria might exist for the price vectors for the simultaneous
price-QoS game, the tatonnement scheme [7][9] can be used
to prove convergence. This scheme is an iterative procedure
that numerically verifies whether multiple price equilibria
exist, and uniqueness is guaranteed if and only if the proce-
dure converges to the same limit when initial values are set
at prmin or prmax. Once the equilibrium price vectors are
determined, the equilibrium service levels are easily com-
puted. If multiple equilibria exist the cloud providers select
the price equilibria that is component-wise the largest.
Regarding the case when CP price vector is given, we have
the following corollary from the result of Theorem 2, which
leads us to equilibrium results of Game 3, a special case of
Game 2.
Corollary 2. Given any CP price vector, prf , the Nash
equilibrium s(prf ) is the dominant solution in the QoS level
game between CPs, i.e., a CP’s equilibrium QoS level is in-
dependent of any of its competitors cost or demand char-
acteristics and prices. When si(pr
f ) > 0, the equilibrium
QoS level is increasing and concave in prfi , with s
′
i(pr
f
i ) =
−x′i(si)
x′′i (si)(pr
f
i −ci−ρi)−
2ρi
(rt−si)3
.
Proof: Substituting prmax = prmin = prf into Theorem
2 leads us to the fact that s(prf ) is a Nash equilibrium of
the QoS level competition game amongst CPs and that it
is also a unique and a dominant solution, since s(prf ) is a
function of pri, ci, and ρi only. (Following from the fact that
si(pri) is the unique root of x
′
i(si)(pri − ci − ρi) = ρi(rt−si)2
if pri ≥ ci + ρi(1 + 1
rt2x′i(0)
) or si(pri) = 0 otherwise.) 
We observe that Game 3 being a special case of Game 2
entails a unique Nash equilibrium, whereas Game 2 entails
multiple Nash equilibria.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we developed inter-organizatinal economic
models for pricing cloud network services when several cloud
providers co-exist in a market, servicing a single applica-
tion type. We devised and analyzed three price-QoS game-
theoretic models relevant to cloud networks. We proved that
a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) exists in two
of our three QoS-driven pricing models. In addition, we also
showed that the NE’s converge; i.e., there is a practically
implementable algorithm for each model that computes the
NE/s for the corresponding model. Thus, even if no unique
Nash equilibrium exists in some of the models, we are guar-
anteed to find the largest equilibria (preferred by the CPs)
through our algorithm.
Our price-QoS models can drive optimal resource provi-
sioning in cloud networks. The NE price and QoS levels
for each cloud provider drives optimal end-user demand in
a given time period w.r.t. maximizing individual CP prof-
its under competition. Servicing end-user demands requires
provisioning capacity. As a part of future work, we plan to
extend our work to develop queueing optimization models
to compute optimal provisioned resources in cloud networks.
Once the optimal values are computed, the power of virtu-
alization in cloud networks makes it possible to execute dy-
namic resource provisioning in a fast and efficient manner in
multiple time periods. Thus, our pricing models are specif-
ically suited to cloud networks. As a part of future work,
we also plan to extend our analysis to the case where cloud
providers are in simultaneous competition with other CPs
on multiple application types.
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